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Abstract. Proxy ring (anonymous proxy) signatures allow an entity to delegate its signing capability
to a group of entities (proxy group) such that only one of the members in the proxy group can generate a
proxy signature on behalf of the delegator while privacy of the proxy signer is protected. Identity-based
versions of proxy ring signatures employ identity strings in place of randomly generated public keys. Our
contribution is two-fold. First, we formalize a security model for identity-based proxy ring signatures.
We note that there exists no formal security model for identity-based proxy ring signatures prior to our
work. Second, we present the first provably secure identity-based proxy ring signature scheme using a
new paradigm called sequential aggregation. The construction is proved secure, under the one-wayness
assumption of RSA, in the random oracle model by presenting a new forking lemma. We should highlight
that the proxy key exposure attack cannot be applied to our scheme. Further, in contrast to the existing
schemes that are based on pairings, our scheme is based on RSA; therefore, it outperforms the existing
schemes in terms of efficiency and practicality.

Keywords: identity-based proxy ring signature, random oracle model, RSA assumption.
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Introduction

Digital signatures are widely deployed around the world and have the backing of significant international
legislation to support their use in electronic environment. One of these cryptographic primitives is proxy
ring signature which supports ensuring service availability for the customers in distributed networks to avoid
the dependency to a single server in addition to preserving privacy of proxy signers. In this work, we are
interested in exploring proxy ring signatures in the identity-based setting, due to its practicality.
Identity-based cryptography. Public-key cryptography has many different applications, but in its basic form, it requires extensive public-key infrastructure for practical use. In order to provide more flexible
management of public keys the notion of identity-based cryptography was introduced by Shamir [1]. The
main feature of identity-based cryptosystems is to remove the requirement of certification of the public keys.
The public key of each party is obtained from its public identity, such as the IP address or email address,
which can uniquely identify the party. Since the introduction of the notion in [1], various identity based
schemes ([2–4]) have been proposed.
Identity-based cryptography has attracted a lot of interest since the elliptic curve pairings are shown to
provide an elegant way for implementing identity-based encryption schemes. In the past ten years, the majority of identity-based cryptosystems proposed have relied on pairings. While extensive research has led to vast
improvements in implementation of pairings, their computational cost is still higher than that of traditional
public key algorithms which use the exponentiation operation in various groups. Moreover, pairing-based
cryptosystems rely on newer and less analyzed computational assumptions in their security analysis compared to traditional schemes that are based on classical assumptions like the widely studied RSA assumption.
There has been a proliferation of pairing-based assumptions whose difficulty is not widely understood and
?
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whose connection to established assumptions, and to each other, remains unknown [5]. Therefore, when designing new identity-based cryptographic primitives it is desirable to diversify the computational assumptions
and to use widely accepted assumptions where possible.
Proxy ring signatures. The notion of proxy signatures was introduced by Mambo et al. [6] in 1996.
In a proxy signature scheme, an original signer, Alice, can delegate her signing right for signing messages
to another signer, Bob, called the proxy signer. Since the introduction of the notion of proxy signatures,
several variants of proxy signatures such as proxy signatures from RSA and integer factorization problem
([7–12]), identity-based proxy signature schemes based on bilinear pairings ([13–19]), designated-verifier proxy
signatures ([20–22]), short proxy signature [23], proxy verifiably encrypted signatures [24], proxy signature
schemes without random oracles [25], identity-based multi-proxy signatures [26], proxy ring signatures ([27–
31]) and identity-based proxy ring signatures from bilinear pairings ([32–39]) have been proposed.
In a proxy ring signature scheme, an original signer can delegate her signing right for signing messages to
a group of proxy signers with different public keys, called the proxy agent, such that only one of the proxy
signers in the proxy group can generate proxy signatures on behalf of the original signer while he could be
anonymous. As mentioned in ([27–29]), this primitive can be used when the requirement of proxy signer’s
privacy protection is necessary. For example, it is assumed that a parliament member would like to reveal
an important news on behalf of the cabinet, while he wants to be anonymous. However, one still needs to
verify public keys of proxy signers and the original signer in addition to verifying the validity of a proxy ring
signature.
Cheng et al. proposed the first identity-based proxy ring signature [35] to facilitate public key certificate
management of these kinds of signatures by merely employing signer’s identities in place of the public keys
and their certificates. Subsequently, there have been some follow-up works in the area of identity-based
proxy ring signatures ([32–34, 36–39]), but unfortunately, none of them supports provable security. Hence,
the formal definition and security model for identity-based proxy ring signature schemes do not yet exist in
the literature.
In the proxy key exposure attack [40] proposed by Schuldt et al., it is assumed that temporal secret
keys of proxy signers stored in a less trusted device can be leaked, while secure storage (for example in a
TPM within a laptop) is available for long term secret keys of proxy signers. With this attack not only
long term secret keys of proxy signers are compromised but also an adversary (with having proxy secret
keys) can generate valid (identity-based) proxy signatures. Therefore, it is vital to consider the proxy key
exposure attack when we present other extensions of proxy signatures, identity-based proxy ring signatures.
Unfortunately, identity-based proxy ring signatures proposed in ([32–39]) are vulnerable to this attack.
1.1

Our Contribution

The main goal of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature, by proposing a formal definition and security
model for identity-based proxy ring signatures. Subsequently, we present the first provably secure identitybased proxy ring signature scheme. The paradigm used in designing this primitive is sequential aggregation of
an identity-based signature and an identity-based ring signature scheme. As a result, our scheme is the first
identity-based proxy ring signature scheme such that the proxy key exposure attack [40] cannot be applied to
it. We achieved this by employing sequential aggregation of two signatures (i.e., the original signer’s signature
and the proxy signer’s ring signature). This is in contrast to the previous technique that employs proxy key
generation algorithm, a function of delegation and proxy long term secret key, to generate proxy secret key.
The latter is vulnerable to the proxy key exposure attack since proxy secret keys are assumed to be stored on
a less trusted device and there is a possibility that the adversary can find proxy secret keys and then proxy
long term secret keys are compromised [40].
To prove security of the scheme, we present a new forking lemma and employ it in the proof of unforgeability. The general forking lemma [41] cannot be applied directly into our scheme since this scheme is the
result of sequential aggregation of two different types of signatures such that we have two different types of
random oracle responses. Hence, we need to consider the probability of happening some random responses
before the forking point in the proposed forking lemma which makes it different from previous forking lemma.
We should highlight that our scheme not only is the first identity-based proxy ring signature with provable
security according to a formally defined security model and is resistance against proxy key exposure attack,
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but also it is the first identity-based proxy ring signature from RSA, which is more efficient than the existing
constructions due to not relying on pairing computations.
1.2

Paper Organization

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents notations and RSA complexity assumption
employed as the signature foundation. The security model of identity-based proxy ring signature including
outline of the identity-based proxy signature scheme and its security properties are given in Section 2. The
proposed scheme and its formal security proofs are presented in Section 3. Section 4 and 5 present the
comparison and conclusion.

2

Background

In this section, first we give notations used throughout the paper and review the RSA assumption, and then
we present the outline and our security definitions for the identity-based proxy ring signature schemes.
2.1

Notations.
$

If S is a set, then s ← S denotes the operation of assigning to s an element of S chosen uniformly at random,
and if (i0 , ..., iz ) is a vector, then i ∈ (i0 , ..., iz ) means that ∃0 ≤ u ≤ z i = iu . If x1 , x2 , ... are objects then
x1 ||x2 ||... denotes an encoding of them as strings from which the constituent objects are effectively recoverable.
Let ⊥ be an empty string and θ ← C(x1 , ...) stands for the operation of assigning the output of algorithm
C on inputs x1 , ... to θ. Let A be an algorithm which has access to H, K, KeyExtract, DelegationGen and
ProxyRingSign oracles of a signature scheme, and can win a game in which a security property of the scheme
is violated by A. If algorithm A is (t, qh , qk , qe , qd , qprs , )-bounded, we mean that the algorithm A which runs
in time at most t, makes at most qh queries to random oracle H, qk queries to random oracle K, qe queries to
KeyExtract oracle, qd queries to DelegationGen and qprs queries to ProxyRingSign oracle can win the game
with probability at least . If probability of an algorithm in doing some tasks is negligible, it means that its
value is less than inverse of a polynomial of input’s length for all sufficiently large values of input’s length.
2.2

The RSA assumption.

An RSA key generator KGrsa is an algorithm that generates triplets (N, e, d) such that N is the product of
two large primes p and q and ed = 1 mod ϕ(N ), where ϕ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1). The advantage of an algorithm
B in breaking the one-wayness of RSA related to KGrsa is defined as

$
$
(N, e, d) ←− KGrsa ; γ ←− ZN ;
ow−rsa
.
AdvKG
(B) = Pr  y = γ e mod N :
rsa
γ ←− B(N, e, y)


(1)

We say that B, (t0 , 0 )-breaks the one-wayness of RSA with respect to KGrsa if it runs in time at most t0
ow−rsa
and has advantage AdvKG
(B) ≥ 0 . We say that the RSA function associated to KGrsa is (t0 , 0 )-one-way
rsa
0 0
if no algorithm B, can (t ,  )-break it.
2.3

Outline of identity-based proxy ring signature schemes

When describing the signature scheme, let identity of each original signer be ID0 , and identity set of proxy
f respectively. The indices used in the signature description have
agent and each subset of that be ID and ID,
no global meaning outside this protocol instance which means that there is no certified relationship between
indices and identities, and just serve as local pointers for original and proxy signers. An identity-based proxy
ring signature scheme consists of five algorithms: ParaGen, KeyExtract, DelegationGen, ProxyRingSign and
ProxyRingVer as follows.
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– ParaGen: This algorithm takes as input the system security parameter l and outputs system’s parameters
P ara and the system’s master key (msk, mpk), i.e. (P ara, (msk, mpk)) ← P araGen(l).
– KeyExtract: This algorithm takes as input the system’s parameter P ara, master public key mpk, master
secret key msk, and an identity IDu . It outputs the corresponding secret key xu for the identity IDu ,
i.e. xu ← KeyExtract(P ara, mpk, msk, IDu ).
– DelegationGen: This algorithm takes as input the system’s parameter P ara, the master public key
mpk, an identity ID0 and an identity set ID, including at least two identities, for an original signer
and a proxy agent, respectively. It also takes as input the secret key x0 of the original signer with
identity ID0 and a message space descriptor w ⊆ {0, 1}∗ for which the original signer with identity
ID0 delegates its signing right to a proxy agent with identity set ID, then, it outputs a delegation
σ0 ← DelegationGen(P ara, mpk, ID0 , ID, w, x0 ).
– ProxyRingSign: This algorithm takes as input the system’s parameter P ara, the master public key mpk,
f of proxy signers including at least two identities, a valid delegation σ0 for a message
the identity set ID
f ⊆ ID and the delegation indicates
space descriptor w and an identity set ID of proxy signers such that ID
that an original signer with identity ID0 delegates its signing right on w to a proxy agent with identity
$ f
set ID, a proxy signer’s secret key xj corresponding to an identity IDj ← ID
⊆ ID and a message
m ∈ w, then, it outputs the identity-based proxy ring signature θ on behalf of the original signer with
f (m, w, σ0 ), xj ).
identity ID0 , i.e. θ ← P roxyRingSign(P ara, mpk, ID0 , ID, ID,
– ProxyRingVer: This algorithm takes as input the system’s parameter P ara, an original signer’s identity
f a message space descriptor w, a signed message m and a
ID0 , the proxy signers’ identity sets ID and ID,
proxy ring signature θ, then, it outputs 1 if θ is a valid identity-based proxy ring signature of the message
f ⊆ ID and outputs 0 otherwise,
m which means that it satisfies the verification equation, m ∈ w and ID
f
i.e. {0, 1} ← P roxyRingV er(P ara, mpk, ID0 , ID, ID, w, m, θ).

2.4

Security models of identity-based proxy ring signature schemes

An identity-based proxy ring signature must satisfy two independent notions of security: unforgeability and
privacy of proxy signer’ identity. We present the first formal definitions for unforgeability and privacy of proxy
signer’s identity, respectively. To achieve existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message (chosen
warrant: chosen message space descriptor and identity set of proxy signers) and chosen identity attack for
identity-based proxy ring signature schemes, three types of potential adversaries as mentioned in [27] are
considered as follows.
– Type I: This type adversary AI only has identities of the original signer and proxy signers, and aims to
forge a valid identity-based proxy ring signature w.r.t. identities of the original signer and proxy signers.
– Type II: This type adversary AII has secret keys of some (one/all) proxy signers in a proxy group in
addition to identities of the original signer and proxy signers, and aims to forge a valid identity-based
proxy ring signature w.r.t. identities of the original signer and proxy signers.
– Type III: This type adversary AIII has the secret key of the original signer in addition to identities of
the original signer and proxy signers, and aims to forge a valid identity-based proxy ring signature w.r.t.
identities of the original signer and proxy signers.
Clearly, if an identity-based proxy ring signature scheme is secure against Type II (or Type III) adversaries
then it is also secure against Type I adversary. Unforgeability against Type I, Type II and Type III adversaries
(AI , AII and AIII ) is formalized using the following game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
1. Setup: C runs the P araGen algorithm with a security parameter l to obtain system’s parameter para
and the master key (mpk, msk), then it sends (mpk, para) to A.
A issues a polynomially bounded number of queries to the following oracles adaptively:
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2. KeyExtract queries: A can ask for the secret key corresponding to each identity IDu , then C returns the
private key xu to the adversary with running the KeyExtract algorithm.
3. DelegationGen queries: Adversary A can request a delegation under the identity ID0 of an original
signer on a message space descriptor w and an identity set ID of its choice for which the original
signer with identity ID0 delegates its signing right on w to a proxy agent with identity set ID. In response, C runs the KeyExtract algorithm to obtain the secret key x0 of the original signer, and returns
σ0 ← DelegationGen(P ara, mpk, ID0 , ID, w, x0 ) to A.
f to C.
4. ProxyRingSign queries: Adversary A can request the proxy ring signature of m w.r.t. ID
In addition, adversary A provides a delegation σ0 of an original signer with identity ID0 for a message space descriptor w and an identity set ID of proxy signers. This delegation was obtained from
DelegationGen algorithm or was generated by adversary A.
Algorithm C checks that σ0 is a valid delegation in which the original signer with identity ID0 delegates
f ⊆ ID;
its signing right for the message space descriptor w to the proxy agent with identity set ID; that ID
and that m ∈ w. If any of these fails to hold, returns ⊥. Otherwise, C runs the KeyExtract algorithm to
$ f
obtain the secret key xj corresponding to one of the proxy signers with identity IDj such that IDj ← ID.
f (m, w, σ0 ), xj ) to
Next, C runs ProxyRingSign algorithm θ ← P roxyRingSign(P ara, mpk, ID0 , ID, ID,
generate the proxy ring signature θ and returns it to the adversary A.
5. Finally, A outputs a valid identity-based proxy ring signature (m∗ , w∗ , θ∗ ) w.r.t. original signer’s identity
g∗ ⊆ ID∗ \ ID
d∗ , where ID
d∗ is the set of corrupted proxy
ID0∗ and proxy signers’ identity sets ID∗ and ID
signers, and wins the game if the following conditions hold.
For A = AI :
g∗ have not been requested to the KeyExtract oracle which means
– E0 : ID0∗ and all identities in ID
that AI does not have secret keys corresponding to them.
– E1 : The pair (w∗ , ID∗ ) has not been requested as one of the DelegationGen queries under the identity
ID0∗ .
g∗ .
– E2 : m∗ has not been requested as one of the ProxyRingSign queries under the identity set ID
The formal definition of existential unforgeability against adversary AI is expressed in Definition 1.
Definition 1. An identity-based proxy ring signature is (t, qh , qe , qd , qprs , )-existentially unforgeable against
adaptive chosen message (warrant) and chosen identity attack if there is no (t, qh , qe , qd , qprs , )-bounded
adversary A which wins the aforementioned game.
For A = AII :
– E0 : ID0∗ has not been requested as one of the KeyExtract queries which means AII does not have the
secret key corresponding to ID0∗ .
– E1 : The pair (w∗ , ID∗ ) has not been requested as one of the DelegationGen queries under the identity
ID0∗ . .
The formal definition of existential unforgeability against adversary AII is expressed in Definition 2.
Definition 2. An identity-based proxy ring signature is (t, qh , qe , qd , )-existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message (warrant) and chosen identity attack if there is no (t, qh , qe , qd , )-bounded adversary A
which wins the aforementioned game.
For A = AIII :
g∗ has not been requested as one of the KeyExtract queries which means that
– E0 : Each identity in ID
g∗ .
AIII does not have the secret keys corresponding to identities in ID
∗
g∗ ⊆ ID∗ .
– E1 :m has not been requested as one of the ProxyRingSign queries under identity set ID
The formal definition of existential unforgeability against adversary AIII is expressed in Definition 3.
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Definition 3. An identity-based proxy ring signature is (t, qh , qe , qprs , )- existentially unforgeable against
adaptive chosen message (warrant) and chosen identity attack if there is no (t, qh , qe , qprs , )-bounded adversary A which wins the aforementioned game.
Privacy of proxy signer’s identity (PPSI) in an identity-based proxy ring signature means that it should
be infeasible for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) distinguisher D to tell which proxy signer in a
proxy group generates θ on a message m. To have a formal definition for this property consider the following
game between a challenger C and a distinguisher D.

1. Setup: C runs the P araGen algorithm with a security parameter l to obtain system’s parameter para
and the master key (mpk, msk), then it sends (mpk, para) to D.
The distinguisher D issues a polynomially bounded number of KeyExtract, DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign queries adaptively as explained in the forgery game.
2. the distinguisher D chooses two honest identities ID1 and ID2 (D never make KeyExtract query for
these two identities), and makes a DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign query on (w, ID) under an idenf = {ID1 , ID2 } ⊆ ID, respectively.
tity ID0 and on the message m ∈ w under the identity set ID
$

In response, C chooses j ← {1, 2}, runs KeyExtract for ID0 and IDj to obtain their corresponding secret keys, and runs DelegationGen on (w, ID) under the identity ID0 to obtain σ0 and returns
f (w, m, σ0 ), xj ) to D.
θ ← P roxyRingSign(P ara, mpk, ID0 , ID, ID,
3. Finally, the distinguisher D outputs j 0 and wins the game if j 0 = j.
The formal definition for privacy of proxy signer’s identity is given in definition 4.
Definition 4. (Privacy of the proxy signer’s identity). An identity-based proxy ring signature scheme is
(t, qh , qe , qd , qprs ,  + 12 )-PPSI-secure if there is no (t, qh , qe , qd , qprs ,  + 12 )-bounded adversary D which can
win the aforementioned game.
If the probability is equal to 12 , the scheme satisfies privacy of the proxy signer’s identity perfectly.

3

Our identity-based proxy ring signature scheme

In this section, we present an identity-based proxy ring signature scheme using a new paradigm called
sequential aggregation of GQ identity-based signature [42] and GQ identity-based ring signature scheme [43].
The main reason of employing this paradigm is to ensure that the proxy key exposure attack does not have
any impact on the scheme. Our scheme generates an identity-based proxy ring signature scheme in a way
that a delegation is original signer’s GQ identity-based signature on a message space descriptor and proxy
signers’ identities concatenated with “11”4 to differentiate delegations from standard signatures, and a proxy
ring signature is sequential aggregation of a delegation and a ring signature generated by one of the proxy
signers on a message, which belongs to the message space descriptor concatenated with “11” to differentiate
them from sequential aggregation of delegations and ordinary ring signatures generated by proxy signers. We
note that the trick to concatenate with “11”, as suggested by Boldyreva et al. [44], prevents trivial attacks
to the scheme.
3.1

Details of identity-based proxy ring signature scheme

In this section, we present the details of identity-based proxy ring signature scheme. When describing the
signature scheme, let identity of each original signer be ID0 , and identity set of each proxy agent and each
f respectively. The indices used in the signature description have no global
subset of that be ID and ID,
4

We borrow this technique from Boldyreva et al. [44] to realize this.
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meaning outside this protocol instance which means that there is no certified relationship between indices
and identities, and just serve as local pointers for original and proxy signers.
It is assumed that n ≥ 2 is the number of identities for proxy signers in the proxy agent, and z ≥ 2 is the
f of ID. Our scheme consists of five algorithms as follows.
size of each subset ID
1. Setup: The system parameters are as follows. Let l1 and lN ∈ N and let K : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l1 and
H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗N be random oracles. Let KGrsa be a RSA key pair generator that outputs triplets
(N, e, d) such that ϕ(N ) > 2lN and with prime encryption exponents e of length strictly greater than
l1 bits. The key distribution center runs KGrsa to generate RSA parameters (N, e, d). It publishes
mpk = (N, e) as the master public key, and keeps the master secret key msk = d secret. Therefore,
public parameters are P ara = {K, H} and mpk.
2. KeyExtract: On input master secret key msk = d and the user identity IDu , the key distribution center computes xu = H(IDu )d mod N , and sends the user secret key xu over a secure and authenticated
channel to the user with identity IDu .
3. DelegationGen: Let w be a message space descriptor for which an original signer with identity ID0 would
like to delegate her signing right to a group of proxy signers with an identity set ID, the delegation
$
is σ0 = (R0 , s0 ) = (r0e mod N, r0 xc00 mod N ), where r0 ← Z∗N and c0 = K(R0 ||w||ID||11). Then, the
original signer publishes the delegation σ0 on (w, ID).
$ f
4. ProxyRingSign: A proxy signer with identity IDj ← ID
⊆ ID (j ∈ {1, ..., z}) can sign a message m ∈ w
anonymously on behalf of the original signer with identity ID0 with his secret key xj and the delegation
σ0 as follows.
$

– For 1 ≤ u 6= j ≤ z, the proxy signer IDj chooses ru ← Z∗N , and computes Ru = rue mod N and
f
cu = K(Ru ||ID||ID||R
0 ||w||m||11).
Q
$
– The proxy signer IDj chooses r ← Z∗N , and computes Rj = re [ u6=j H(IDu )−cu ] modN and cj =
f
K(Rj ||ID||ID||R
0 ||w||m||11).
Q
c
– The proxy signer IDj computes s = s0 xjj r u6=j ru mod N .
– The proxy ring signature is θ = (R0 , ..., Rz , s) on the message m and the message space descriptor w
f ⊆ ID of proxy signers.
w.r.t. original signer’s identity ID0 and a subset ID
f of the proxy
5. ProxyRingVer: Given the identity ID0 of an original signer and identity sets ID and ID
signers, a message space descriptor w, a message m, and a proxy ring signature θ, a verifier operates as
follows:
– Checks if m ∈ w, otherwise, it stops.
f ⊆ ID, otherwise, it stops.
– Checks if ID
Qz
– Accepts the proxy ring signature if and only if se = R0 H(ID0 )c0 [ u=1 Ru H(IDu )cu ], where c0 =
f
K(R0 ||w||ID||11) and cu = K(Ru ||ID||ID||R
0 ||w||m||11) for 1 ≤ u ≤ z.
3.2

Analysis of the scheme

In this section, we verify the correctness, and prove the privacy of the proxy signer’s identity and existential
unforgeability of the proposed scheme in the random oracle model (see [45] for the background).
In order to prove unforgeability of the proposed scheme, we need to show that it is unforgeable against
adversaries of types II and III (as defined in Section 2.4). Since our security proofs are quite similar in both
cases, we have parametrized these proofs to prevent unnecessary repetitions of arguments. Hence, just for
notational settings, we refer to the adversary as A(1−ζ)II+ζIII in which the parameter ζ ∈ {0, 1} makes the
difference between adversaries of types II and III (i.e. notationally we assume that we have an adversary of
type II, AII , when ζ = 0 and an adversary of type III, AIII , when ζ = 1). Note that, the proofs for different
values of ζ are independent.
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To prove the security of our proposed scheme, and by contradiction, assuming an adversary A(1−ζ)II+ζIII ,
we show that there is a solver (algorithm B) that can solve a random instance of the RSA problem with a
non-negligible probability. To do this, we first show that there exists a simulator called CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII that
can simulate the signature scheme without knowing the secret key(s) of the honest signer(s), and runs the
adversary A(1−ζ)II+ζIII as its sub-routine. In this regard, we compute the run-time and a lower-bound for the
success (returning a useful output ({Ru }0≤u≤z , s, {cu }0≤u≤z , {xu }0≤u≤z , m, w) (see Definition 5)) probability
of this simulator in terms of the run-time and success (returning a valid forgery θ = (R0 , ..., Rz , s, c0 , ..., cz ) on
f ⊆ ID
a message m under the message space descriptor w w.r.t. original signer’s identity ID0 and a subset ID
of proxy signers) probability of the adversary and the number of queries to the oracles (see Lemma 1).
At the final stage, we use a forking strategy to solve an instance (N, e, y) of the RSA problem, using a
useful pair (see Definition 6) of the simulator CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII when the random string used in both simulations
are the same. Hence, we concentrate on computing a lower bound for the probability of producing such a
useful pair and solving the RSA instance as the main body of the solver algorithm B (see Lemma 3). We
should highlight that the general Forking Lemma [41] cannot be applied directly into our scheme since this
scheme is the result of sequential aggregation of two different types of signatures such that we have two
different types of random oracle responses. Hence, we need to consider the probability of happening some
random responses before the forking point in the proposed forking lemma, and this is the main difference of
our Forking Lemma from previous ones.
Our main result on the security of the proposed scheme is summarized in Theorem 1, where the parameter
ζ is used to code the result for both adversaries of types II and III.
To start let us verify the correctness of the proposed scheme. Note that, all computations are done modulo
N , but we omit this for simplicity.
Q
c
se = se0 (xjj r u6=j ru )e
Q
= se0 (xej )cj re ( u6=j rue )
Q
Q
= R0 H(ID0 )c0 H(IDj )cj Rj u6=j (H(IDu )cu )( u6=j Ru )
Q
z
= R0 H(ID0 )c0 [ u=1 Ru H(IDu )cu ].
Q
The equality re = Rj [ u6=j H(IDu )cu ] mod N is used in Eq. (2).

(2)

Definition 5. Let ζ ∈ {0, 1} be a constant and the algorithm CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII return ({Ru }0≤u≤z , s, {cu }0≤u≤z ,
f ⊆ ID, m, w), θ) produced by an adversary A(1−ζ)II+ζIII
{xu }0≤u≤z , m, w) derived from a valid forgery ((ID0 , ID
when CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII simulates the signature scheme. The tuple ({Ru }0≤u≤z , s, {cu }0≤u≤z , {xu }0≤u≤z , m, w)
Qz
is a useful output if se = R0 (xe0 y 1−ζ )c0 [ u=1 Ru (xeu y ζ )cu ] holds.
Lemma 1. Let ζ ∈ {0, 1} and z ≥ 2 be a constant and lN be a security parameter. Assuming the existence
of an (t, qh , qk , qe , (1 − ζ)qd , ζqprs , )-bounded adversary A(1−ζ)II+ζIII with success probability at least  and
run-time t, there exists a simulator CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII for the signature scheme that does not use the secret key(s)
of the honest signer(s), and produces a useful output ({Ru }0≤u≤z , s, {cu }0≤u≤z , {xu }0≤u≤z , m, w) such that,
a) the success probability of CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII is greater than
def

ε = ζ(



2
− (2qprs
+ qprs qk )2−lN ) + (1 − ζ)(
22z qez
4qe
−(2qd2 + qd qk )2−lN ,

b) the run-time of CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII is less than
def

τ = t + (1qe + 1qh + (1 − ζ)2qd + ζ2zqprs )texp ,
where texp is the time of one exponentiation in Z∗N , and qh , qk , qe , qd and qprs are the number of queries to the
random oracle H, the random oracle K, KeyExtract, DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign oracle, respectively.
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Proof. Assume the existence of an (t, qh , qk , qe , ζqd , (1 − ζ)qprs , )-bounded adversary A(1−ζ)II+ζIII on the
public data mpk = (N, e) which runs in time at most t, makes qh queries to the random oracle H, qk queries to
the random oracle K, qe queries to the KeyExtract, (1 − ζ)qd queries to the DelegationGen and ζqprs queries
to ProxyRingSign oracle, and can win the unforgeability game with probability at least . The algorithm
CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII maintains initially empty associative arrays TK [.] and T [.], and answers A(1−ζ)II+ζIII ’s oracle
queries as described below.
– K(Q) queries: If TK [Q] is defined then CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII returns its value, otherwise CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII chooses
$

TK [Q] ← {0, 1}l1 , and returns TK [Q] to A(1−ζ)II+ζIII . Note that, in DelegationGen Q = (R0 ||w||ID||11)
f
and in ProxyRingSign Q = (Ru ||ID||ID||R
0 ||w||m||11).
– H(IDu ) queries: We employ Coron’s technique [46] to obtain a tighter security bound when simulating H.
$

If T [IDu ] = (b, xu , Xu ) then CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII returns Xu . If this entry is not yet defined, it chooses xu ← Z∗N
and tosses a biased coin b so that b = 0 with probability β and b = 1 with probability 1 − β. If b = 0, then
CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII sets Xu = xeu mod N ; if b = 1, it sets Xu = xeu y mod N . It stores T [IDu ] ← (b, xu , Xu )
and returns Xu to A(1−ζ)II+ζIII .
– KeyExtract queries for IDu : Algorithm CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII looks up T [IDu ] = (b, xu , Xu ), if this entry is not
yet defined, it performs a query H(IDu ). If b = 0, then CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII returns xu ; otherwise, it sets
badKE ← true and aborts the execution of A(1−ζ)II+ζIII .
– DelegationGen queries for (w, ID) under identity ID0 : Algorithm CAII performs a query H(ID0 ) and
looks up T [ID0 ] = (b, x0 , X0 ). If b = 0, then CAII simulates the delegation of ID0 with the DelegationGen
algorithm σ0 ← DelegationGen(P ara, mpk, x0 , w, ID) since CAII knows x0 , the original signer’s secret
$

$

key. If b = 1, CAII first chooses c0 ← {0, 1}l1 and s0 ← Z∗N and computes R0 ← se0 X0−c0 mod N . If
TK [R0 ||w||ID||11] has already been defined, then CAII sets badDG ← true and halts; otherwise, it sets
TK [R0 ||w||ID||11] ← c0 , and returns σ0 = (R0 , s0 , c0 ) to the adversary AII .
f Adversary AIII provides a delegation σ0 on a message
– ProxyRingSign queries for a message m w.r.t. ID:
space descriptor w and an identity set ID. Algorithm CAIII first checks if the delegation for (w, ID)
f ⊆ ID. If so, CA
is valid under identity ID0 , if m ∈ w and if ID
proceeds as follows. If bu = 0
III
for some 1 ≤ u ≤ z, CAIII knows some xu and can generate a valid proxy ring signature following
ProxyRingSign algorithm. If for all 1 ≤ u ≤ z, we have bu = 1, CAIII for 1 ≤ u 6= j ≤ z chooses
$
f
ru ← Z∗N , and computes Ru = rue mod N and cu = K(Ru ||ID||ID||R
0 ||w||m||11) by querying to oracle
$
$
−c Q
K. Next, CAIII selects cj ← {0, 1}l1 and ŝ ← Z∗N , and computes Rj ← ŝe Xj j u6=j (Ru−1 Xu−cu ) mod N
f
and s = s0 ŝ. If TK [Rj ||ID||ID||R
0 ||w||m||11] has already been defined, then CAIII sets badP S ← true
f
and halts; otherwise, it sets TK [Rj ||ID||ID||R
0 ||w||m||11] ← cj and returns the proxy ring signature
θ = (R0 , ..., Rz , s, c0 , ..., cz ) on the message m and the message space descriptor w w.r.t. original signer’s
f for proxy signers.
identity ID0 and two identity sets ID and ID
To lower-bound the probability that CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII does not abort at answering to queries of A(1−ζ)II+ζIII ,
we need to compute η = (1 − ζ) Pr[¬badKE ] Pr[¬badDG |¬badKE ] + ζ Pr[¬badKE ] Pr[¬badP S |¬badKE ], where
events badKE , badDG and badP S indicate that CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII aborts in signature simulation as a result of any
of A(1−ζ)II+ζIII ’s KeyExtract, DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign queries, respectively. These probabilities
are computed as follows.
Claim 1.

Pr[¬badKE ] ≥ β qE .

Proof. Pr[¬badKE ] is the probability that CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII does not abort as a result of A(1−ζ)II+ζIII ’s
KeyExtract queries. The algorithm CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII aborts at answering to a KeyExtract query when badKE
is set to true which means that b = 1 for a given identity. The probability of this event is 1 − β, so the
probability that CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII does not abort for one KeyExtract query is β. Since A(1−ζ)II+ζIII makes
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at most qe KeyExtract queries, the probability that CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII does not abort as a result of qe KeyExtract queries is at least β qe .
Claim 2.

Pr[¬badDG |¬badKE ] ≥ 1 − qd (qd + qk )2−lN − qd2 2−lN .

Proof. Events ¬badKE and ¬badDG are independent, so Pr[¬badDG |¬badKE ] = Pr[¬badDG ]. The value
of Pr[¬badDG ] is the probability that CAII does not abort as a result of DelegationGen queries. The
algorithm CAII aborts at answering to a DelegationGen query if badDG is set to true which means that
there is a conflict in the table TK [.] for these kinds of queries. The probability of finding a conflict in TK [.]
for one DelegationGen query (w, ID) equals the probability that (R0 ||w||ID||11) generated in a DelegationGen simulation has been occurred by chance in a previous query to the oracle K. Since there are at
most qk + qd entries in the table TK [.] for these kinds of queries and the number of R0 , uniformly distributed in ZN , is 2lN , the probability of this event for one DelegationGen query is at most (qd + qk )2−lN .
Hence, the probability of this event for qd queries is at most qd (qd + qk )2−lN . In addition, this probability
includes the probability that CAII previously used the same randomness R0 , uniformly distributed in ZN ,
in one DelegationGen simulation. Since there are at most qd DelegationGen simulations, this probability
is at most qd 2−lN . Therefore, for qd DelegationGen queries the probability of this event is at most qd2 2−lN .
Claim 3.

2
2−lN .
Pr[¬badP S |¬badKE ] ≥ 1 − qprs (qprs + qk )2−lN − qprs

Proof. Events ¬badKE and ¬badP S are independent, so Pr[¬badP S |¬badKE ] = Pr[¬badP S ]. The value of
Pr[¬badP S ] is the probability that CAIII does not abort as a result of ProxyRingSign queries. The algorithm CAIII aborts at answering to a ProxyRingSign query if badP S is set to true which means that there
is a conflict in table TK [.] for these kinds of queries. The probability of finding a conflict in TK [.] for one
f
ProxyRingSign query equals the probability that (Rj ||ID||ID||R
0 ||w||m||11) generated in ProxyRingSign
simulation has been occurred by chance in a previous query to the oracle K. Since there are at most
qk +qprs entries in the table TK [.] for these kinds of queries and the number of Rj , uniformly distributed in
ZN , is 2lN , the probability of this event for one ProxyRingSign is at most (qprs +qk )2−lN . Hence, the probability of this event for qprs queries is at most qprs (qprs + qk )2−lN . In addition, this probability includes
the probability that CAIII previously used the same randomness Rj , uniformly distributed in ZN , in one
ProxyRingSign simulation. Since there are at most qprs ProxyRingSign simulations, this probability is at
2
most qprs 2−lN . Therefore, for qprs ProxyRingSign queries the probability of this event is at most qprs
2−lN .
Finally, it is assumed that A(1−ζ)II+ζIII outputs a valid forgery θ = (R0 , ..., Rz , s, c0 , ..., cz ) on a message
m under message space descriptor w w.r.t. original signer’s identity ID0 and proxy signers’ identity sets
f with probability at least  in time bound t. Since the forgery is valid, we have
ID and ID
se = R0 H(ID0 )c0 [

z
Y

Ru H(IDu )cu ],

u=1

and AII has not asked (w, ID) from DelegationGen algorithm under original signer’s identity ID0 and
AIII has not asked the message m from ProxyRingSign algorithm under proxy signer’s identity set
f ⊆ ID. In addition, a valid forgery has to contain one uncorrupted identity or z uncorrupted identities
ID
for AII and AIII , respectively. These probabilities are computed as follows.
Claim 4. The probability that AII outputs a valid forgery including one uncorrupted identity is at least
(1 − β).
Proof. It is assumed that AII outputs a valid forgery with probability at least . The probability that
a valid forgery contains one uncorrupted identity is 1 − β. The probability of existence of one honest
identity with b = 1 is 1 − β. Therefore, the probability that AII outputs a valid forgery containing one
uncorrupted identity is at least (1 − β).
Claim 5. The probability that AIII outputs a valid forgery including z uncorrupted identities is at least
(1 − β)z .
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Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Claim 4.
Therefore, the probability that CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII returns a useful output is at least ((1 − ζ)(1 − β) + ζ(1 −
β)z )η ≥ ((1 − ζ)(1 − β) + ζ(1 − β)z )β qe − ((1 − ζ)qd ((2qd + qk )2−lN ) − ζqprs (2qprs + qk )2−lN ). The value of
e
e
β qe (1−β) is maximized for β = qeq+1
. With substituting the value of β, we obtain β qe (1−β) = ( qeq+1
)qe qe1+1 =
1
1
1
1+qe
1+qe
. If qe = 0, this value is 1 and (1 − qe +1 )
is a monotonically increasing sequence for
qe (1 − qe +1 )
1
qe
qe ≥ 1. Therefore, the lower bound of β (1 − β) is 4qe . Similarly, the value of β qe (1 − β)z ≥ 22z1qz .
e
To estimate the required time of CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII in returning a useful output, the required time tC in which
CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII answers A(1−ζ)II+ζIII ’s queries is computed as follows. Since it is assumed that a (multi) exponentiation in ZN takes time texp while all other operations take zero time, each random oracle or
KeyExtract query takes at most one exponentiation, a delegation simulation takes 2 exponentiations, and
a proxy ring signature simulation takes 2z exponentiations, we therefore have that tC ≤ (1qe + 1qh + (1 −
ζ)2qd + ζ2zqprs )texp .
Finally, CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII performs additional random oracle queries H(IDu ) for identities in the forgery to
find T [IDu ] = (b, xu , Xu ) for them, and returns ({Ru }0≤u≤z , s, {cu }0≤u≤z , {xu }0≤u≤z , m, w) with probability
2
+ qprs qk )2−lN ) + (1 − ζ)( 4qe − (2qd2 + qd qk )2−lN in time bound t + (1qe + 1qh + (1 −
at least ζ( 22zqz − (2qprs
e
ζ)2qd + ζ2zqprs )texp .
Also, in what follows we will be needing the following Splitting lemma.
Lemma 2. [47]. Let A ⊂ X × Y such that Pr[(x, y) ∈ A] ≥ δ. For any α < δ, define B = {(x, y) ∈
X × Y | Pry0 ∈Y [(x, y 0 ) ∈ A] ≥ δ − α} and B̄ = (X × Y ) \ B, then the following statements hold:
– Pr[B] ≥ α
– ∀(x, y) ∈ B, Pry0 ∈Y [(x, y 0 ) ∈ A] ≥ δ − α
– Pr[B|A] ≥ αδ .
Definition 6. Let ζ ∈ {0, 1} be a constant. A pair of useful outputs ({Ru }0≤u≤z , s, {cu }0≤u≤z , {xu }0≤u≤z , m,
w) and ({Ru0 }0≤u≤z , s0 , {c0u }0≤u≤z , {x0u }0≤u≤z , m0 , w0 ) is said to be a useful pair if Ru = Ru0 , 0 ≤ u ≤ z, s 6= s0 ,
cu 6= c0u for one 0 ≤ u ≤ z and cu = c0u other u, xu = x0u , 0 ≤ u ≤ z, m = m0 and w = w0 hold.
Definition 7. The probabilistic polynomial time algorithm CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII at each run proceeds based on a
def

def

random string ω and answers ρ = (ρ1 , ..., ρqt ) to the queries Q = (Q1 , ..., Qqt ) made to the random oracle K.
A pair of (ω, ρ) is said to be a successful pair if CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII produces a useful output ({Ru }0≤u≤z , s, {cu }0≤u≤z ,
{xu }0≤u≤z , m, w) based on them.
Lemma 3. (A Forking Lemma). Let ζ ∈ {0, 1} be a constant, z and l1 be the number of proxy signers in a
proxy ring and a security parameter, respectively. Also let K be a random oracle, and qt be the total number of
queries to K. It is assumed that CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII returns a useful output ({Ru }0≤u≤z , s, {cu }0≤u≤z , {xu }0≤u≤z , m,
w) with probability at least ε in time bound τ . Then, a replay of CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII with the same random string
and a different random oracle gives a useful pair in time t0 ≤ 2τ with probability 0 ≥
Pqt −z−1 Qz−1
1 ≥ ε − (z + 1)2−l1 and π = j=1
[ i=0 (qt − i − j)].

21 (1−2−l1 )
,
8π

where

Proof. Consider the probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII with a random string ω,
def

that answers to the queries Q = (Q1 , ..., Qqt ) made to the random oracle K, and stores these queries and the
def

corresponding answers ρ = (ρ1 , ..., ρqt ) in the table TK [.]. Let iu ∈ {1, ..., qt } be the index of cu for 0 ≤ u ≤ z,
def

such that ρiu = cu . For a given value cu , if there is no ρiu = cu in TK [.], we define iu = ∞. By hypothesis, for
a random choice of (ω, ρ), CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII produces a useful output ({Ru }0≤u≤z , s, {cu }0≤u≤z , {xu }0≤u≤z , m, w)
with probability at least ε in time bound τ .
Since K is a random oracle, the probability of the event
c0 = K(R0 ||w||ID||11)
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and
f
cu = K(Ru ||ID||ID||R
0 ||w||m||11)
for 1 ≤ u ≤ z is less than (z + 1)2−l1 , unless they are asked during the attack. Hence, it is likely that the
f
questions (Ru ||ID||ID||R
0 ||w||m||11) for 1 ≤ u ≤ z and (R0 ||w||ID||11) are asked during a successful attack.
We define set Υ as the set of successful pairs (ω, ρ), Υ = {(ω, ρ)| CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII (ω) produces a useful output
& ∞∈
/ (i0 , ..., iz )}. The lower bound of probability of producing a useful output is 1 = Pr[Υ ] ≥ ε−(z+1)2−l1 ,
and let κ = max{i ∈ (i0 , ..., iz )}.
We also define Iz+1 = {(i0 , ..., iz ) | 1 ≤ iu ≤ qt & ∀u 6= v iu 6= iv & i0 < max{iu for 1 ≤ u ≤ z}} when
ζ = 1, and Iz+1 = {(i0 , ..., iz ) | 1 ≤ iu ≤ qt & ∀u 6= v iu 6= iv & i0 > max{iu for 1 ≤ u ≤ z}} when ζ = 0.
Since CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII makes query to the random oracle K for a successful pair (ω, ρ) ∈ Υ , then we
define set Υi = {(ω, ρ)| CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII (ω) produces a useful output & (i0 , ..., iz ) = i} for all vectors i ∈
Iz+1 as a subset of Υ in which query Qi0 = (R0 ||w||ID||11) was made to random oracle K before one
f
of queries Qiu = (Ru ||ID||ID||R
0 ||w||m||11) for 1 ≤ u ≤ z when ζ = 1, and when ζ = 0, queries Qiu =
f
(Ru ||ID||ID||R0 ||w||m||11) for 1 ≤ u ≤ z were made to random oracle K before query Qi0 = (R0 ||w||ID||11).
Pqt −z−1 Qz−1
The cardinality of set Iz+1 in both cases is π = j=1
[ i=0 (qt − i − j)]. This gives us a partition of Υ
in exactly π classes. Let I be the set consisting of most likely vectors i ∈ Iz+1 , I = {i ∈ Iz+1 | Pr[Υi0 |Υ ] ≥ 21 π1 }.
1
.
Hence, for each i ∈ I, Υi is denoted as Υi0 , we have Pr[Υi0 ] = Pr[Υi0 |Υ ] Pr[Υ ] ≥ 2π
0
With splitting the randomness ρ related to the oracle K as ρ = (ρ1 , ..., ρκ−1 ), where ρ0 denotes a vector of
answers to all queries to the random oracle K before index κ. We employ Splitting Lemma, taking X = (ω, ρ0 ),
1
1
Y = (ρκ , ..., ρqt ), A = Υi0 , δ = 2π
and α = 4π
. This lemma ensures the existence of a subset Ωi of executions
α
1
0
(ω, ρ) such that Pr[Ωi |Υi ] ≥ δ = 2 and for each (ω, ρ) ∈ Ωi , Pr(ρ0κ ,...,ρ0q ) [(ω, (ρ0 , ρ0κ , ..., ρ0qt )) ∈ Υi0 ] ≥ δ − α =
t
1
2π .
P
P
Since Υi0 are disjoint, and we have Pr(ω,ρ) [∃i ∈ I s.t. Ωi ∩ Υi0 |Υ ] = i∈I Pr[Ωi ∩ Υi0 |Υ ] = i∈I Pr[Ωi |Υi0 ]
P

Pr[Υ 0 |Υ ]

≥ 41 .
Pr[Υi0 |Υ ] ≥ i∈I 2 i
Let i denote a vector of a successful pair with probability at least 14 , i ∈ I and (ω, ρ) ∈ Ωi ∩ Υi0 . If
we replay the attack with fixed (ω, ρ0 ) and randomly chosen (ρ0κ , ..., ρ0qt ), we get another successful pair
−l1

)
(ω, (ρ0 , ρ0κ , ..., ρ0qt )) such that ρκ 6= ρ0κ with probability 1 (1−2
.
2π
After two successful executions of CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII , the algorithm B obtains (ω, (ρ0 , ρκ , ..., ρqt )) and (ω, (ρ0 , ρ0κ ,
..., ρ0qt )), ρiu 6= ρ0iu for κ ≤ iu ≤ qt which means that B obtains a useful pair ({Ru }0≤u≤z , s, {cu }0≤u≤z , {xu }0≤u≤z , m, w)

and ({Ru0 }0≤u≤z , s0 , {c0u }0≤u≤z , {x0u }0≤u≤z , m0 , w0 ) with probability 0 ≥
Pqt −z−1 Qz−1
π = j=1
[ i=0 (qt − i − j)].
The running time t0 of B is twice that of CA(1−ζ)II+ζIII , t0 ≥ 2τ .

21 (1−2−l1 )
,
8π

where 1 ≥ ε−(z+1)2−l1 ,

Theorem 1. If the RSA function associated to Kgrsa is (t0 , 0 )-one-way, then the proposed signature scheme
is (t, qh , qk , qe , (1−ζ)qd , ζqprs , )-secure against (t, qh , qk , qe , (1−ζ)qd , ζqprs , )-bounded adversary A(1−ζ)II+ζIII
for a constant ζ ∈ {0, 1} such that
0 ≥

21 (1−2−l1 )
Pqk +(1−ζ)qd +ζqprs −z−1 Qz−1
8 j=1
[ i=0 (qk +(1−ζ)qd +ζqprs −i−j)]

t0 ≤ 2t + 2(1qe + 1qh + (1 − ζ)2qd + ζ2zqprs )texp ,

(3)

2
where 1 ≥ ζ( 22zqz − (2qprs
+ qprs qk )2−lN ) + (1 − ζ)( 4qe − (2qd2 + qd qk )2−lN − (z + 1)2−l1 , texp is the time
e
of an exponentiation in Z∗N , and z and l1 are the number of proxy signers in a proxy ring and a security
parameter, respectively.

Proof. In the proof, we consider two cases for the forgery depending on type of adversaries. In the first case,
we type II adversary, while in the second one type III adversary. Then, we show that the algorithm B can
1
solve a random instance of the RSA problem (N, e, y) such that γ = y e mod N .
Case 1. In this case, we consider adversaries of type II (i.e., ζ = 0). According to Lemma 1, CAII returns
a useful output ({Ru }0≤u≤z , s, {cu }0≤u≤z , {xu }0≤u≤z , m, w) in time τ = t + (1qe + 1qh + 2qd )texp with
probability at least ε = 4qe −(2qd2 +qd qk )2−lN . Then, the algorithm B, the RSA solver, will produce a useful
pair of ({Ru }0≤u≤z , s, {cu }0≤u≤z , {xu }0≤u≤z , m, w) and ({Ru }0≤u≤z , s0 , c00 , {cu }1≤u≤z , {xu }0≤u≤z , m, w)
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with probability at least 0 ≥

( 4qe −(2qd2 +qd qk )2−lN −(z+1)2−l1 )2 (1−2−l1 )
Pqk +qd −z−1 Qz−1
8 j=1
[ i=0 (qk +qd −i−j)]

in time t0 ≥ 2t+2(1qe +1qh +2qd )texp

(see Lemma 3). Since a useful pair contains two useful outputs, we have
z
Y

se = R0 (xe0 y)c0 [

u
Ru xec
u ]

u=1

and
0e

s =

z
Y

0
R0 (xe0 y)c0 [

u
Ru xec
u ].

u=1
(c0 −c )

0

By dividing the two aforementioned equations, we obtain (x0 0 0 ss0 )e = y (c0 −c0 ) mod N .
Since c0 6= c00 ∈ {0, 1}l1 and e is a prime of length strictly greater than l1 , we have e > (c0 − c00 ) and
therefore gcd(e, (c0 − c00 )) = 1. Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, one can find a, b ∈ Z such that
0
(c0 −c )
ae + b(c0 − c00 ) = 1. Hence, we have y = y ae+b(c0 −c0 ) = (y a (x0 0 0 ss0 )b )e mod N . Therefore, algorithm
(c0 −c0 ) s b
s0 ) )

B outputs (y a (x0 0

as the RSA inversion of y in time t0 with probability 0 .

Case 2. In this case, we consider adversaries of type III (i.e., ζ = 1). According to Lemma 1, CAIII returns a
useful output ({Ru }0≤u≤z , s, {cu }0≤u≤z , {xu }0≤u≤z , m, w) in time bound τ = t + (1qe + 1qh + 2zqprs )texp
2
+qprs qk )2−lN . Then, the algorithm B, the RSA solver, will prowith probability at least ε = 22zqz −(2qprs
e
duce a useful pair of ({Ru }0≤u≤z , s, {cu }0≤u≤z , {xu }0≤u≤z , m, w) and ({Ru }0≤u≤z , s0 , c0κ , {cu }0≤u6=κ≤z ,
{xu }0≤u≤z , m, w) with probability at least 0 ≥ (


z
22z qe

2
−(2qprs
+qprs qk )2−lN −(z+1)2−l1 )2 (1−2−l1 )
Pqk +qprs −z−1 Qz−1
[ i=0 (qk +qprs −i−j)]
8 j=1

in time t0 ≥

2t + 2(1qe + 1qh + 2zqprs )texp (see Lemma 3). Since a useful pair contains two useful outputs, we have
0
se = R0 xec
0 [

z
Y

Ru (xeu y)cu ]

u=1

and

0

e cv
0
s0e = R0 xec
0 [(xv y)

Y

Ru (xeu y)cu ].

1≤u6=v≤z
c −c0

0

By dividing the two aforementioned equations, we obtain (xvv v ss0 )e = y (cv −cv ) mod N .
Since cv 6= c0v ∈ {0, 1}l1 and e is a prime of length strictly greater than l1 , we have e > (c0v − cv ) and
therefore gcd(e, (c0v − cv )) = 1. Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, one can find a, b ∈ Z such that
0
c −c0
ae + b(c0v − cv ) = 1. Hence, we have y = y ae+b(cv −cv ) = (y a (xvv v ss0 )b )e mod N . Therefore, algorithm B
c −c0v s b
s0 ) )

can output (y a (xvv

as the RSA inversion of y in time t0 with probability 0 .

Theorem 2. The identity-based proxy ring signature scheme is (t, qh , qk , qe , qd , qprs , 21 )-PPSI-secure since the
probability of D in guessing the identity of the proxy signer for a given signature θ, Pr[D(θ) = IDj ] (where
f = {ID1 , ID2 }), is 1 against (t, qh , qk , qe , qd , qprs , )-bounded adversary D.
IDj ∈ ID
2
Proof. The distinguisher D issues a polynomially bounded number of random oracle, KeyExtract, DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign queries adaptively as explained in the forgery game.
Then, D chooses two honest identities ID1 and ID2 for proxy ring (D never make KeyExtract query
for these two identities), and makes a DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign query on (w, ID) under an idenf = {ID1 , ID2 } ⊆ ID, respectively. In
tity ID0 and on the message m ∈ w under the identity set ID
$

response, C chooses j ← {1, 2}, runs KeyExtract for ID0 and IDj to obtain their corresponding secret keys, then runs DelegationGen on (w, ID) under an identity ID0 to obtain σ0 and returns θ ←
f (w, m, σ0 ), xj ) to D. Finally, the distinguisher D outputs j 0 = j
P roxyRingSign(P ara, mpk, ID0 , ID, ID,
1
with probability 2 . To show the value of this probability, we compute the probability that IDj generates
valid values for R1 and R2 of θ which are pairwise different. The probability of choosing different values for
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Table 1. Comparison between our proposal and provably secure schemes
Scheme

Ours

DeleGen DeleVer PRSign

PRVer

Sign

Cost

Cost

Size

Cost

Cost

2exp

2exp

+1mN

+1mN +(2n + 2)mN +(n + 2)mN

Li et al.[28] 1eG

2P

(2n + 1)exp

(2n − 1)eG

(n + 2)exp

(n +

2nP + (2n − 2)mGT + 1eG nG

Hard

ID

problem -based
2)Z∗N

RSA

X

Bilinear ×
Pairing

R1 and R2 is 2lN1−1 2lN1−2 . Then, s is computed from random numbers ru for u 6= j in Ru and r employed
in Rj . The probability of generation of the proxy ring signature θ = (R0 , R1 , R2 , s) is independent from the
identity of the real signer IDj , then, this probability is the same for two members in the set of proxy signers.
Therefore, the probability of D in guessing the real signer is 12 .

4

Comparison

The comparison for some provably secure (identity-based) proxy ring signature schemes is summarized in
Table 1. The comparison is in terms of DeleGen-Cost, DeleVer-Cost , PRSign-Cost and PRVer-Cost , dominating computational cost in delegation generation, delegation verification, proxy ring signature generation
and proxy ring signature verification, respectively. In Table 1, P , eG , mG2 , exp and mN denote the pairing
evaluation, exponentiation in group G, pairing multiplication in G2 , exponentiation in Z∗N and multiplication
in Z∗N , respectively. For the sake of comparison it is assumed that other operations take zero time and z = n
f = ID.
which means that ID
Since previous identity-based proxy ring signature schemes ([32–39]) do not support provable security,
they are not considered in comparison. All Traditional proxy ring signature schemes [27–31] are based on
bilinear pairings, where some schemes [29–31] do not support provable security, and the provably secure
scheme [27] presented by Yu et al. is not secure as shown by J.S. Chou [31]. Hence, we just consider the only
provably secure proxy ring signature scheme [28] proposed by Li et al. in comparison. As shown in Table 1,
our scheme compared to Li et al.’s provably secure proxy ring signature scheme [28] has a proper advantage in
efficiency since one pairing computation costs roughly 2.3 exponentiations according to the current MIRACL
implementation [48], a 512-bit Tate pairing takes 20 ms whereas a 1024-bit prime modular exponentiation
takes 8.8 ms at the same security level, and with considering the most costly operation, pairing computation,
the cost of PRVer algorithm of Li et al.’s scheme is as 4.6 times as that of ours and the cost of DeleVer
algorithm of Li et al.’s scheme is as 2.3 times as that of ours.
However, it is obvious that the size of our signature is increased due to the size of public parameters in
RSA problem, this scheme is the first identity-based proxy ring signature scheme form RSA (widely used
assumption) assumption. Furthermore, all (identity-based) proxy ring signatures are not resistant against
proxy key exposure attack [40], while the proxy key exposure attack can not be applied to our scheme since
it is sequential aggregation of delegation and proxy group’s ring signature, and there is no proxy secret key
stored in a less trusted device to be leaked.

5

Conclusion

In this paper, first, we formalized a security model for identity-based proxy ring signatures, then, we present
the first provably secure identity-based proxy ring signature scheme. This scheme is the first identity-based
proxy ring signature scheme from RSA, and consequently it is a response to the need of some companies
for having identity-based proxy ring signature from RSA (sine they are reluctant to reinvesting in new
implementation). Hence, it has a proper advantage in efficiency due to the avoiding pairing computations
since the cost of each pairing computation is roughly that of 2.3 exponentiations. Furthermore, the proxy
key exposure attack is not applicable to our scheme since it is generated based on sequential aggregation
paradigm.

15

References
1. Shamir, A. (1985) Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes. Proc. of the 4th Annual Int. Cryptology
Conf. on Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO 1984, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, 19-22 August, pp. 47–53. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg.
2. Choon, J. and Cheon, J. (2002) An identity-based signature from gap diffie-hellman groups. Proc. of the 6th Int.
Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography, Public Key Cryptography PKC 2003, Miami, FL,
USA, 6-8 January, pp. 18–30. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
3. Hess, F. (2002) Efficient identity based signature schemes based on pairings. Proc. of the 9th Annual Int. Workshop
on Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC 2002), Newfoundland, Canada, 15-16 August, pp. 216–231. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg.
4. Barreto, P., Libert, B., McCullagh, N., and Quisquaterd, J. (2005) Efficient and provably-secure identity-based
signatures and signcryption from bilinear maps. Proc. of the 11th Int. Conf. on the Theory and Application of
Cryptology and Information Security, Aavances in Cryptology-ASIACRYPT 2005, Chennai, India, 4-8 December,
pp. 515–532. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
5. Boyen, X. (2008) The uber-assumption family. Proc. of the 2nd Int. Conf. on Pairing-Based Cryptography (Pairing
2008), Egham, UK, 1-3 September, pp. 39–56. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
6. Mambo, M., Usuda, K., and Okamoto, E. (1996) Proxy signatures: Delegation of the power to sign messages.
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics,Communications and Computer Sciences, 79, 1338–1354.
7. Shao, Z. (2009) Provably secure proxy-protected signature schemes based on RSA. Computers & Electrical
Engineering, 35, 497–505.
8. Shao, Z. (2003) Proxy signature schemes based on factoring. Information Processing Letters, 85, 137–143.
9. Zhou, Y., Cao, Z., and Lu, R. (2005) Provably secure proxy-protected signature schemes based on factoring.
Applied Mathematics and Computation, 164, 83–98.
10. Park, J. H., Kang, B. G., and Han, J. W. (2005) Cryptanalysis of Zhou et al.’s proxy-protected signature schemes.
Applied Mathematics and Computation, 169, 192–197.
11. Liu, Y.-C., Wen, H.-A., Lin, C.-L., and Hwang, T. (2007) Proxy-protected signature secure against the undelegated
proxy signature attack. Computers & Electrical Engineering, 33, 177–185.
12. Hu, X., Xu, H., and Si, T. (2010) Analysis and improvement of proxy-protected signature secure against the
undelegated proxy signature attack. Journal of Computational Information Systems, 6, 2997–3002.
13. Gu, C. and Zhu, Y. (2005) Provable security of ID-based proxy signature schemes. Proc. of the 3rd Int. Conf.
on Networking and Mobile Computing (ICCNMC 2005), Zhangjiajie, China, 2-4 August, pp. 1277–1286. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg.
14. Zhang, J. and Zou, W. (2007) Another ID-based proxy signature scheme and its extension. Wuhan University
Journal of Natural Sciences, 12, 33–36.
15. Wu, W., Mu, Y., Susilo, W., Seberry, J., and Huang, X. (2007) Identity-based proxy signature from pairings.
Proc. of the 4th Int. Conf. on Autonomic and Trusted Computing (ATC 2007), Hong Kong, China, 11-13 July,
pp. 22–31. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
16. Gu, C. and Zhu, Y. (2008) An efficient ID-based proxy signature scheme from pairings. Proc. of the 3rd SKLOIS
Conf. on Information Security and Cryptology (Inscrypt 2007), Xining, China, 31 August- 5 September, pp. 40–50.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
17. Ji, H., Wang, Y., Han, W., and Zhao, L. (2009) An identity-based proxy signature from bilinear pairings. Proc.
of WASE Int. Conf. on Information Engineering (ICIE 2009), Taiyuan, Shanxi, 10-11 July, pp. 14–17. IEEE.
18. Xu, J., Zhang, Z., and Feng, D. (2005) ID-based proxy signature using bilinear pairings. Proc. of Parallel and
Distributed Processing and Applications Workshops(ISPA 2005), Nanjing, China, 2-5 November, pp. 359–367.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
19. Shim, K. (2006) An identity-based proxy signature scheme from pairings. Proc. of the 8th Int. Conf. on Information and Communications Security (ICICS 2006), Raleigh, NC, USA, 4-7 December, pp. 60–71. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg.
20. Lu, R. and Cao, Z. (2005) Designated verifier proxy signature scheme with message recovery. Applied Mathematics
and Computation, 169, 1237–1246.
21. Yu, Y., Xu, C., Zhang, X., and Liao, Y. (2009) Designated verifier proxy signature scheme without random oracles.
Computers & Mathematics with Applications, 57, 1352–1364.
22. Shim, K. (2011) Short designated verifier proxy signatures. Computers & Electrical Engineering, 37, 180–186.
23. Huang, X., Mu, Y., Susilo, W., Zhang, F., and Chen, X. (2005) A short proxy signature scheme: efficient authentication in the ubiquitous world. Proc. of Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing Workshops(EUC 2005), Nagasaki,
Japan, 6-9 December, pp. 480–489. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
24. Zhang, J., Liu, C., and Yang, Y. (2010) An efficient secure proxy verifiably encrypted signature scheme. Journal
of Network and Computer Applications, 33, 29–34.

16
25. Huang, X., Susilo, W., Mu, Y., and Wu, W. (2006) Proxy signature without random oracles. Proc. of the 2nd Int.
Conf. on Mobile Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks (MSN 2006), Hong Kong, China, 13-15 December, pp. 473–484.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
26. Cao, F. and Cao, Z. (2009) A secure identity-based multi-proxy signature scheme. Computers & Electrical
Engineering, 35, 86–95.
27. Yu, Y., C. Xu, X. H., and Mu, Y. (2009) An efficient anonymous proxy signature scheme with provable security.
Computer Standards & Interfaces, 31, 348–353.
28. Li, J., Chen, X., and Yuen, T. H. (2006) Proxy ring signature: formal definitions, efficient construction and new
variant. Proc. of Int. Conf. on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS 2006), Guangzhou, China, 3-6
November, pp. 545–555. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
29. Zhang, F., Safavi-Naini, R., and Lin, C. (2003) New proxy signature, proxy blind signature and proxy ring
signature schemes from bilinear pairings. Cryptography ePrint Archive, pp. 1–11.
30. Zhang, J. (2009) On the security of a proxy ring signature with revocable anonymity. Proc. of Int. Conf. on
Multimedia Information Networking and Security ( MINES’09), Hubei, China, 18-20 November, pp. 205–209.
IEEE.
31. Chou, J.-S. (2012) A novel anonymous proxy signature scheme. Advances in Multimedia, 2012, 1–10.
32. Awasthi, A. K. and Lal, S. (2005) ID-based ring signature and proxy ring signature schemes from bilinear pairings.
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive cs/0504097 , ?
33. Awasthi, A. K. and Lal, S. (2007) ID-based ring signature and proxy ring signature schemes from bilinear pairings.
International Journal of Network Security, 4, 187–192.
34. Zhao, Z., X. Tang, B. L., and Zhu, L. (2006) An ID-based anonymous proxy signature from bilinear pairings.
Proc. of the 2006 Int. Conf. on Security and Management (SAM 2006), Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, 26-29 June,
pp. 138–144. CSREA Press.
35. Cheng, W., Lang, W., Yang, Z., Liu, G., and Tan, Y. (2004) An identity-based proxy ring signature scheme from
bilinear pairings. Proc. of the 9th Int. Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC 2004), Nanjing,
China, 28 June-1 July, pp. 424–429. IEEE.
36. Lei, W. and Daxing, L. (2009) An efficient ID-based proxy ring signature scheme. Proc. of WRI Int. Conf. on
Communications and Mobile Computing (CMC’09), Yunnan, China, 6-8 January, pp. 560–563. IEEE.
37. Wu, L. and Kong, F. (2009) An efficient ID-based proxy ring signature scheme. Journal of Shandong University
(Natural Science), 1, 2441–2447.
38. Cui, S. and Wen, F. (2010) An identity-based multiple grade anonymous proxy signature scheme. Journal of
Computational Information Systems, 6, 2441–2447.
39. Ajmath, K. A., Reddy, P. V., Rao, B. U., and Varma, S. V. K. (2012) Identity-based directed proxy ring signature
scheme. Journal of Discrete Mathematical Sciences and Cryptography, 15, 181–192.
40. Schuldt, J., Matsuura, K., and Paterson, K. (2008) Proxy signatures secure against proxy key exposure. Proc. of
the 11th Int. Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public-Key Cryptography (PKC 2008), Barcelona, Spain, 9-12
March, pp. 141–161. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
41. Bellare, M. and Neven, G. (2006) Multi-signatures in the plain public-key model and a general forking lemma.
Proc. of the 13th ACM Conf. on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2006), Alexandria, Virginia,
USA, 4-8 December, pp. 390–399. ACM, New York, NY.
42. Guillou, L. and Quisquater, J. (1990) A paradoxical identity-based signature scheme resulting from zeroknowledge. Proc. of the 8th Annual Int. Cryptology Conf. on Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO 1988, Santa
Barbara, CA, USA, 21-25 August, pp. 216–231. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
43. Herranz, J. (2007) Identity-based ring signatures from RSA. Theoretical Computer Science, 389, 100–117.
44. Boldyreva, A., Palacio, A., and Warinschi, B. (2010) Secure proxy signature schemes for delegation of signing
rights. Journal of Cryptology, 25, 57–115.
45. Bellare, M. and Rogaway, P. (1993) Random oracles are practical: A paradigm for designing efficient protocols.
Proc. of the 1st ACM Conf. on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 1993), Fairfax, VA, USA, 3-5
November, pp. 62–73. ACM, New York, NY.
46. Coron, J. (2000) On the exact security of full domain hash. Proc. of the 20th Annual Int. Cryptology Conf. on
Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO 2000, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, 20-24 August, pp. 229–235. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg.
47. Pointcheval, D. and Stern, J. (2000) Security arguments for digital signatures and blind signatures. Journal of
Cryptology, 13, 361–396.
48. Miracl. http://www.shamus.ie/.

